Extending Typicality for Description Logics by Booth, Richard et al.
Extending Typicality for Description Logics
Richard Booth1, Giovanni Casini2, Thomas Meyer3, and Ivan Varzinczak4
1 Cardiff University, United Kingdom
2 Univ. of Luxembourg, Luxembourg
3 CAIR, University of Cape Town and CSIR Meraka, South Africa
4 CRIL, Univ. Artois & CNRS, F-62300 Lens, France
Abstract. Recent extensions of description logics for dealing with different forms
of non-monotonic reasoning don’t take us beyond the case of defeasible subsump-
tion. In this paper we enrich the DL EL⊥ with a (constrained version of) a typ-
icality operator •, the intuition of which is to capture the most typical members
of a class, providing us with the DL EL•⊥. We argue that EL•⊥ is the smallest
step one can take to increase the expressivity beyond the case of defeasible sub-
sumption for DLs, while still retaining all the rationality properties an appropriate
notion of defeasible subsumption is required to satisfy, and investigate what an
appropriate notion of non-monotonic entailment for EL•⊥ should look like.
1 Introduction
Given the success story of description logics (DLs) [1] as knowledge representation
formalisms for modern AI applications, the past decades have witnessed many attempts
to endow them with non-monotonic reasoning features. These essentially range from
preferential approaches [2–9] to circumscription [10–12], amongst others [13–17].
Up until now, most of the effort in this direction has been put into the study of defea-
sible inheritance via non-monotonic versions of the subsumption relation. To witness,
Britz et al. [4, 5] have introduced defeasible subsumption statements of the form C<∼D,
whereas Giordano et al. [7, 18] have enriched the concept language with a typicality op-
eratorT(·) allowing us to state subsumptions of the formT(C) v D. Both approaches
aim at formalising the intuition according to which “Cs are usually Ds” or “typical Cs
are Ds” and build on the well-established KLM approach (after Kraus, Lehmann and
Magidor [19]) to defeasible consequence of the form ϕ |∼ ψ in propositional logic.
Recently, Bonatti et al. [15] also introduce a typicality-like operator N(·) in the
concept language. In their framework, it becomes possible to define concepts of the
form ∃r.N(C), referring to those objects that are related to typical Cs. This allows us
to state subsumptions of the form N(C) v ∃r.N(D), for which properties beyond the
Boolean ones would be required in order to characterise the behaviour of defeasibility.
However, Bonatti et al.’s construction is based on a particular semantic framework and
does not satisfy all the rationality properties associated with preferential approaches.
In previous work, Booth et al. [20, 21] investigated the addition of a typicality oper-
ator • to propositional logic, of which the semantics is given in terms of KLM ranked
models [22]. It turns out the logic thus obtained is more expressive than that of KLM
conditional statements, allowing us to move beyond the defeasible conditionals of the
propositional case. Following up on that, Booth et al. [23] investigated two seman-
tic versions of entailment in the presence of •, constructed using two different forms
of minimality. Both are based on the notion of Rational Closure (RC) as defined by
Lehmann and Magidor [22] for KLM-style propositional conditionals. It was shown
that (i) these notions of entailment can be viewed as generalised definitions of Rational
Closure, (ii) that they are equivalent w.r.t. the conditional language originally proposed
by Kraus et al., but (iii) they are different in the language enriched with •.
In this paper we show that these results provide us with the springboard necessary
to truly move beyond the case of defeasible subsumption in a preferential DL setting.
In doing so we take the following route. After presenting the background required for
the rest of the work (Section 2), we introduce an unrestricted form of typicality for the
DL EL⊥ (Section 3). In Section 3 we also point out the issues brought about by the typ-
icality operator in EL⊥, which takes us to the study of typicality for EL•⊥, a language
extending the DL EL⊥ (Section 4). In Section 5, we show that it is possible to define
a notion of non-monotonic entailment for EL•⊥ which satisfies properties seen as im-
portant in a defeasible-reasoning context. We conclude the paper with a discussion and
directions for future investigation. A document with the proofs of all the propositions
can be downloaded at http://tinyurl.com/zley8ab.
2 Background
2.1 KLM-Style Defeasible Description Logics
Description Logics (DLs) [1] are a family of decidable fragments of first-order logic
exhibiting interesting computational properties. In this paper we focus on one of the
least expressive DLs, referred to as EL⊥. We will see that EL⊥ is already sufficient to
express the problem we have in moving from the propositional case to the DL case, and
to present significant language constraints that can enforce some desired properties.
The (concept) language of EL⊥ is built upon a finite set of atomic concept namesNC
and a finite set of role names NR such that NC ∩ NR = ∅. We shall use A,B, . . .as
‘meta-variables’ for the atomic concepts, and r, s, . . .to denote role names. WithC,D, . . .
we denote the complex EL⊥-concepts, built according to the following rule:
C ::= A | > | ⊥ | (C u C) | ∃r.C
With LEL⊥ we denote the language of all EL⊥ concepts. The semantics of EL⊥ is
the standard set-theoretic Tarskian semantics. An interpretation is a structure I :=
〈∆I , ·I〉, where ∆I is a non-empty set called the domain, and ·I is an interpretation
function mapping concept names A to subsets AI of ∆I and role names r to binary
relations rI over ∆I : AI ⊆ ∆I , rI ⊆ ∆I ×∆I .
Given an interpretation I = 〈∆I , ·I〉, ·I is extended to interpret complex concepts
of LEL⊥ in the following way:
>I = ∆I , ⊥I = ∅, (C uD)I := CI ∩DI ,
(∃r.C)I := {x ∈ ∆I | for some y, (x, y) ∈ rI and y ∈ CI}
Given C,D ∈ LEL⊥ , C v D is a subsumption statement, read “C is subsumed by
D”. C ≡ D is an abbreviation for C v D and D v C. We shall denote subsump-
tion statements with α, β, . . .. An EL⊥ TBox (alias terminology) T is a finite set of
subsumption statements. An interpretation I satisfies a subsumption statement C v D
(denoted I  C v D) if and only if CI ⊆ DI . (And then I  C ≡ D if and only if
CI = DI .) We say that an interpretation I is a model of a TBox T (denoted I  T )
if and only if I  α for every α ∈ T . A statement α is (classically) entailed by a
TBox T , denoted T |= α, if and only if every model of T satisfies α. If T = ∅, then
we have that I  α for all interpretations I, in which case we say α is a validity and
denote with |= α. The notion of defeasible subsumption [4] is captured by statements
of the form C <∼ D, read “an element of C is usually an element of D”, where C and
D are complex concepts of the underlying classical DL. The semantics of defeasible
subsumption is defined in terms of ordered structures called ranked interpretations [2]:
Definition 1 (Ranked Interpretation). A ranked interpretation is a structure R :=
〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉, where 〈∆R, ·R〉 is a standard DL interpretation and ≺R is a modular
order over ∆R satisfying the smoothness condition (given C ∈ LEL⊥ , for every x ∈
CR, either x ∈ min≺R CR or there is y ∈ CR such that y ≺R x and y ∈ min≺R CR.5
Given a set X , ≺ ⊆ X × X is modular if and only if there is a ranking function
rk : X −→ N (N being the set of the natural numbers) such that for every x, y ∈ X ,
x ≺ y if and only if rk(x) < rk(y).6
In a ranked interpretation R, the intuition is that those objects that are lower down
in the ordering are deemed more normal (or typical) than those higher up. A ranked
interpretation R satisfies the defeasible subsumption C <∼ D (noted R  C <∼ D) if
and only if min≺ CR ⊆ DR, in other words, if the most typical Cs fall under D.
R satisfies a classical subsumption statement C v D (noted R  C v D) if and
only if CR ⊆ DR. A ranked interpretation R is a ranked model of a set of statements
(defeasible or classical) T if and only ifR  α for every α ∈ T .
The domain ∆R of a ranked model R can be partitioned into a sequence of layers
{LR0 , LR1 , LR2 , . . .}, where x ∈ LR0 iff x ∈ ∆R and there is no y ∈ ∆R s.t. y ≺R x;
x ∈ LRi+1 iff x ∈ ∆R \
⋃
0≤j≤i L
R
j and and there is no y ∈ ∆R \
⋃
0≤j≤i L
R
j s.t.
y ≺R x.
Using the layers we can also introduce the function hR, indicating the height of an
object in a model R: for every x ∈ ∆R, hR(x) = i iff x ∈ LRi . Such a notion of
height can be extended to concepts, where the height of a concept C is the lowest layer
in which some object falls under the concept C: hR(C) = i iff min≺R(CR)∩LRi 6= ∅.
5 Given X ⊆ ∆R, with min≺R X we denote the minimal elements of X w.r.t. ≺R, i.e., the set
{x ∈ X | for every y ∈ X, y 6≺R x}.
6 The standard definition of modularity does not refer to the set N, but to a random (potentially
uncountable) totally ordered set. Since the DLs logics used here, enriched with defeasible
subsumption, satisfy the FMP, it is provable that to study relevant notion of entailment we
can restrict our attention to countable domains, and in particular to constraint the notion of
modularity as we have done here (see [2, Section 5] for details). Since the FMP holds also w.r.t.
the language we will use from Section 4 on (see Theorem 1 and Corollary 1), we are justified
in using this contrained definition of modularity. We have chosen to use such a definition for
the sake of exposition.
Given a TBox T , possibly containing defeasible subsumption statements, we are in-
terested in which other subsumption statements (defeasible or classical), follow from T .
Among the possible notions of entailment that can be defined into this formal frame-
work, Rational Closure (RC), originally introduced in the propositional framework [22]
has a particular relevance, because of the following reasons: (i) it satisfies desirable log-
ical properties [22]; (ii) it satisfies the principle of presumption of typicality [24, p. 63],
which, informally, specifies that a situation (in the DL case, the objects in the domain)
should be assumed to be as typical as possible (w.r.t. the background information in a
knowledge base), and (iii) it can easily be implemented on top of classical reasoners.
RC is commonly viewed as the basic (although certainly not the only acceptable)
form of nonmonotonic entailment, on which other, more venturous forms of entailment
can be constructed. It is for this reason that various adaptations to DLs have been pro-
posed [2, 25]. Informally, from a semantic point of view, in order to define a model
characterising RC we have to minimise the position of the individuals in the model, that
is, the RC of T is characterised by the model(s) of T in which the objects are positioned
in the lowest possible layer: the lower the position in the model, the more typicality is
enforced in the interpretation of individuals. A particularly desirable property of RC
is that, both in the propositional and in the DL cases, there is a unique minimal con-
figuration among the models of the KB, a property that guarantees the satisfaction of
desirable logical properties [6], and ease the definition of a model characterising RC
and the definition of a decision procedure. For more details on RC for DLs, and how to
introduce minimal configurations in the semantics, the reader is referred to the work by
Britz et al. [2] and by Giordano et al. [25].
2.2 Propositional Typicality Logic
Propositional Typicality Logic (PTL) [20, 21] is a recently proposed logic allowing for
the representation of and reasoning with an explicit notion of typicality. It is obtained
by enriching classical propositional logic with a typicality operator •, the intuition of
which is to capture the most typical (or normal) situations in which a given sentence
holds. Here we briefly present the main results about PTL relevant for our purposes.
Let P be a finite set of propositional atoms, denoted by p, q, . . ., possibly with sub-
scripts. The language of PTL, denoted by L•, is recursively defined by:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | •ϕ
All the other truth-functional connectives (∨, →, ↔, . . . ) are defined in terms of ¬
and ∧ in the usual way. Moreover, > and ⊥ are seen as abbreviations for, respectively,
p ∨ ¬p and p ∧ ¬p, for some p ∈ P .
Intuitively, a sentence of the form •ϕ is understood to refer to the typical situations
in which ϕ holds. Note that ϕ can itself be a •-sentence. The semantics of PTL is in
terms of the propositional counterpart of our ranked interpretations (Definition 1). Let
U denote the set of all propositional valuations v : P −→ {0, 1}.
Definition 2. A (propositional) ranked interpretation is a pair R := 〈V,≺〉, where
V ⊆ U and ≺ ⊆ V × V is a modular order on V .
Let R = 〈V,≺〉 and let v ∈ V . Classical sentences are evaluated as usual, whereas
v  •ϕ (the valuation v satisfies •ϕ) if and only if v  ϕ (the valuation v satisfies
ϕ) and there is no v′ ≺ v such that v′  ϕ. A PTL Knowledge Base is a finite set of
formulas, that is satisfiable iff there is a (propositional) ranked modelR s.t.R satisfies
all the formulas in it.
A useful property of the typicality operator • is that it allows us to express KLM-
style conditionals. That is, for every ranked interpretation R and all propositional sen-
tences ϕ,ψ, R  ϕ |∼ ψ if and only if R  •ϕ → ψ. The converse does not hold
since it can be shown that there are L•-sentences that cannot be expressed as a set of
KLM-style |∼-statements [21]. In other words, • delivers a more expressive framework
than the original KLM conditional language.
Booth et al. [23] have recently investigated different (semantic) versions of entail-
ment for PTL. These are based on the notion of RC as defined in the propositional
case [22], and are constructed using minimality. An important realisation from these
results is that in augmenting the expressivity beyond defeasible conditionals, the notion
of minimality we want to introduce becomes problematic: notions that were equivalent
in the propositional case now give back different results.
3 Typicality Operators in DLs
EL⊥ can be extended with a typicality operator on concepts as follows:
C ::= A | (C u C) | ∃r.C | > | ⊥ | •C
The intuition is that a concept •C represents the set of the most typical elements
of the concept C. As in the propositional case, we use ranked interpretations to inter-
pret the language, and use the ranking to interpret the typicality operator. The classical
DL interpretation function is extended to include the concepts containing the typicality
operator with the condition (•C)R := min≺R(CR).
A TBox is still a finite set of subsumption axioms C v D, where C and D are
concepts in this extended language. As in the classical case, a ranked interpretation R
(Defintion 1) satisfies a subsumption axiom C v D (R  C v D) iff CR ⊆ DR.
A TBox T is satisfiable iff there is a ranked interpretation R s.t. R  α for every
α ∈ T . Up to now the proposed extensions of DLs to model defeasible reasoning about
what typically holds have taken into account the introduction of defeasible subsumption
(see Section 2.1). Analogous to the PTL case, a subsumption C <∼D can be translated
in our framework as •C v D. Giordano et al. [26, 8, 25] have introduced a typicality
operatorT in the language, but only axioms of the formT(C) v D are allowed. Hence
it does not go beyond the expressivity of defeasible subsumption. Bonatti et al. [15]
introduce a typicality operator N (‘Normally’) and they use it to model, beyond the
defeasible subsumption, concepts such as ∃r.N(C). This is a useful construct to have in
modelling defeasibility in DLs. However, their work is done in a semantical framework
that differs from the preferential approach. As it was seen in the case of PTL, enriching
the language with a typicality operator allows us to express useful information beyond
the defeasible conditionals. In the DL framework we are allowed to give information
about the typicality of the objects connected through roles. That is, we can express
subsumptions such as C v ∃r. • C or C v ∀r. • C. Such axioms turn out to be very
interesting in the DL framework, since they allow us to model useful inferences.
Example 1. Assume we have an ontology modelling the information that, typically,
husbands are married to wives (•H v ∃m.W ), and that typical wives are female
(•W v F ). From such an ontology it would be reasonable to conclude that, typically,
husbands are married to women (•H v ∃m.F ): since we have no information forcing
us to conclude that the wife of a typical husband is atypical in any way, we would like
to reason assuming that she is typical, and hence a woman, if not informed of the con-
trary. Therefore, we want to be able to conclude that presumably typical husbands are
married to women (•H v ∃m.F ).
To the best of our knowledge, none of the proposals in the preferential approaches are
able to enforce the maximisation of typicality for the concepts appearing after roles
(as W in ∃r.W ).7 An alternative solution is to follow the same approach that Bonatti
et al. [15] have applied in their own framework. That is, to enforce the typicality of
the concepts after a role by means of a typicality operator. In our example it would
correspond to introducing into the ontology the axiom •H v ∃m. •W , that, combined
with •W v F , would allow us to derive the desired conclusion (•H v ∃m.F ).
Here we extend our work [23] to the DL case and investigate how the minimisation
techniques behave when moving beyond the expressivity of defeasible subsumption
axioms. The role connections in DLs make the comparison of distinct interpretations
slightly trickier than the propositional case. In order to compare the objects appearing
in the distinct models, that could be characterised by distinct domains, we introduce
a correspondence relation among objects, a step analogous to the one taken by Gior-
dano et al. [25]. Given a ranked interpretation R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉, we indicate with
IR = 〈∆R, ·R〉 its classical part. Consider the set U composed of all the pairs (I, x)
where I is a classical EL⊥ interpretation and x ∈ ∆I .
Definition 3 (Function f ). Let (I, x), (J , y) ∈ U . (I, x) ∼c (J , y) iff, for every
C ∈ LEL⊥ ,
x ∈ CI iff y ∈ CJ .
Given a pair (I, x), we indicate with f((I, x)) the set of its correspondent pairs:
f((I, x)) = {(J , y) ∈ U | (I, x) ∼c (J , y)}.
In what follows, we will use the expression (R, x), with R a ranked interpretation,
as referring to the pair (IR, x). Let ∆R be the domain of a ranked modelR partitioned
into n+ 1 layers {LR0 , . . . , LRn }; let f(LRi ) indicate the set containing the equivalence
classes that correspond to each (R, x), with x ∈ LRi , that is, f(LRi ) = {f((R, x)) |
x ∈ LRi }.
In order to implement the principle of presumption of typicality in our framework,
we introduce into the present framework the kind of investigation that was started for
7 At least, this is the case for TBox reasoning. For the case of ABox reasoning, namely in deriv-
ing typicality assertions about individuals participating in a role, the issue has been addressed
by Giordano et al. [7, 8].
PTL. Among the possible options identified by Booth et al. [23], one notion of mini-
mality turned out to be particularly interesting, LM-minimality, since, for every satisfi-
able PTL Knowledge Base, there is only one minimal configuration and one minimal
characteristic model. Such uniqueness of the minimal model makes this notion of min-
imality particularly desirable, since it guarantees the satisfaction of formal desiderata
and makes the definition of a decision procedure simpler [23]. First of all, we will check
here whether such a notion of minimality preserves its desirable properties in the DL
framework.
The notion of LM-minimality, that in the conditional case gives back a notion of
entailment corresponding to RC, is defined referring to the maximisation of the size of
lower (more typical) layers. The bigger a lower layer in an interpretation, the higher is
the level of typicality that such an interpretation enforces. This notion of minimality is
modelled through the relation ELM, that can be described as follows.
Take any pair of ranked interpretationsR1 andR2.∆R1 is partitioned into {L1, . . . , Ln}
and ∆R2 into {M1, . . . ,Mn} (we can assume they have the same number of layers; if
it is not the case, we can fill up the tail of the shorter sequence of layers with ∅’s).
Definition 4 (Relation ELM).
R1 ELM R2 iff either f(Li) = f(Mi) for all i
or for the first j s.t. f(Lj) 6= f(Mj)
we have f(Lj) ⊇ f(Mj)
R /LM R′ iff R ELM R′ and not R′ELMR. Given a TBox T , a model R of T is
LM-minimal iff there is no modelR′ of T s.t.R′ /LM R.
The related notion of entailment is defined as follows.
Definition 5 (LM-entailment |=LM ). Given a TBox T and an axiomC v D, T |=LM
C v D iff
R  C v D for every LM-minimal modelR of T
In the conditional case we end up with a unique ranked model characterising an
entailment relation corresponding to RC. In PTL this uniqueness property is still pre-
served [23] since every satisfiable PTL knowledge base has a single LM-minimal model.
In the case of DL TBoxes, however, the uniqueness of the LM-minimal model does not
hold: we can have models of the same TBox that are not ELM-comparable and for
which there is no model that is ELM-preferred to both of them.
Example 2. Consider a Tbox T = {•B v F, P v B,P v E,E u F v ⊥, C v
∃r.(•D u •P )}. We try to build minimal models of TBox T . The concept P cannot be
satisfied by any object in Layer 0 of the model, since every P is a B, but typical Bs are
F , that is incompatible with P . Hence every object satisfying •P must be in Layer 1 or
higher. We also require that every object satisfying C is connected through a role r to
some object satisfying both •D and •P . Hence, because of what we just deduced about
•P , no object in C can be connected through r to any object in Layer 0. We have two
possibilities: either there are no objects satisfying D in Layer 0, allowing the existence
of some object satisfying •D and •P , or we introduce some objects satisfying D in
Layer 0, in which case we have to conclude that the interpretation of C is the empty set,
since there are no objects satisfying •D u •P . Both the options allow for the definition
of LM-minimal models of T that are not ELM-comparable.
4 The Logic EL•⊥
To recap, on the one hand we would like to extend the language of defeasible subsump-
tion in DLs. In particular, the introduction of concepts such as ∃r. • C would be very
useful. On the other hand, Example 2 shows that going beyond the expressivity of de-
feasible subsumption in DLs results in the loss of unique minimal configurations, even
for LM-minimality, the most ‘reliable’ form of minimisation in PTL.
There are two possible ways to try and resolve this matter. We can either constrain
the expressivity of the language, or we can investigate possible changes in the definition
of minimisation. We shall see below that it is necessary to consider both. With respect
to expressivity, we consider here the smallest extension of EL⊥ that is interesting from
a modelling point of view. The concepts are defined as:
C ::= A | C u C | ∃r.C | > | ⊥
D1 ::= C | •C
D2 ::= C | ∃r. • C
Axioms are of the formD1 v D2. We will refer to this language as EL•⊥. EL•⊥minimally
extends defeasible subsumption, allowing only for the use of concepts of the form
∃r. • C in order to model representation problems such as the one in Example 1. How-
ever, constraining the language to EL•⊥is not sufficient, as Example 3 shows.
Example 3. Consider a Tbox T = {•B v F, P v B,P v E,E u F v ⊥, •> v
A,C v ∃r. • D}. R1 and R2 are two models of such a TBox. R1 is composed of a
single object x, and we have CR1 = BR1 = FR1 = AR1 = DR1 = {x}, PR1 =
ER1 = ∅, and rR1 = {(x, x)}. R2 is composed of two objects z, y s.t. z ≺R2 y, and
we set CR2 = FR2 = AR2 = {z}, PR2 = ER2 = DR2 = {y}, BR2 = {z, y},
and rR1 = {(z, y)}. It is easy to check that they are both models of T ; note that
z /∈ (∃r.A)R2 , and that y ∈ •DR2 , since we do not have any object satisfying D in the
lower layer.
We shall now try to define a modelR3 of T that is ELM-preferred to both of them.
Such a model should contain in Layer 0 two objects x′, z′ s.t. x′ ∈ f(R1, x) and z′ ∈
f(R2, z). Now, in order to satisfy the axiom C v ∃r. •D, z′ must be related through
r to some object u ∈ •DR3 ; since we have at least x′ ∈ DR3 in Layer 0, z′ must be
related through r to some object u ∈ DR3 in Layer 0 (it could be x′ itself, for example).
However, all the objects in Layer 0 must be in AR3 because of the axiom •> v A, and
therefore z′ ∈ (∃r. • D)R3 enforces the conclusion z′ ∈ (∃r.A)R3 . However, since
z /∈ (∃r.A)R2 , z′ /∈ f(R2, z).
Constraining of the language is not enough, hence we consider possible changes
in the definition of minimality. In the example above, the main issue in preventing
the definition of a model that is ELM-preferred to both R1 and R2 is the following:
in R2 the object y satisfies •D only in the particular context defined by the models,
since y must be in Layer 1 or higher (since it satisfies P ) and there are no objects
satisfying D in the lower layer of R2. But it is logically possible to have models of T
with objects satisfying D in Layer 0, as it is the case withR1. Our (refined) proposal is
that, in minimisation, we consider a notion of typicality (that is, an interpretation of the
• operator) that is more objective. That is, it refers to the most typical objects satisfying
a conceptC w.r.t. all the models of a TBox T , and not only w.r.t. the objects represented
in a specific model.
We thus refine the notion of LM-preference w.r.t. a particular TBox. For every con-
cept C, we indicate with hT (C) the minimal height of the concept C w.r.t. all the
models of T .
– For each EL⊥ conceptC and each ranked modelR, hR(C) = i iff min≺R(CR) ⊆
LRi .
– hT (C) = min{hR(C) | R  T }.
Using the function hT , we can formally define our idea about the interpretation of
typicality, and define a refinement of LM-minimality.
Definition 6 (LM∗-minimality). Given a TBox T , a model R of T is LM∗-minimal
iff:
1. R is a LM-minimal model of T ;
2. For every C ∈ `EL⊥T , either hR(C) =∞ or hR(C) = hT (C).
The definition of the related notion of entailment is as in the previous cases.
Definition 7 (LM∗-entailment |=LM∗ ). Given a TBox T and an axiomC v D, T |=LM∗
C v D iff
R  C v D for every LM∗-minimal modelR of T .
From the constructions of Britz et al. [2] and Giordano et al. [25] it can be shown
that, in case of TBoxes containing only defeasible subsumption axioms of the form
C <∼D (and hence being equivalent to •C v D), LM∗-minimality corresponds to LM-
minimality, since for every TBox T , in every LM-minimal modelR of T , and for every
C ∈ `EL⊥T , hR(C) = hT (C). In what follows we are going to describe a procedure
to identify, given a TBox T , the model characterising the entailment relation based on
LM∗-minimality.
5 Construction of Characteristic Schema
In order to prove what follows it is relevant to know that EL•⊥ satisfies the Finite Model
Property (FMP) and a related Finite Countermodel Property (FCMP).
Theorem 1 (FMP). Let T be a finite EL•⊥TBox. If T has a ranked model R, then T
has a finite ranked modelR′ s.t., for every C ∈ `EL⊥T , hR(C) = hR′(C).
Corollary 1 (FCMP). Let T be a finite EL•⊥TBox and C v D an EL•⊥axiom. If T has
a ranked modelR s.t.R is not a model ofC v D, then T has also a finite ranked model
R′ s.t. it is a counter-model of C v D and, for every C ∈ `EL⊥T , hR(C) = hR′(C).
The first step in order to define a characteristic model for LM∗-entailment in EL•⊥
is a transformation of the TBox. Given a TBox T , let T ′ be the TBox obtained by
substituting in T every concept ∃r. • C with ∃r.C. That is, we transform every axiom
D1 v ∃r. • C in T in the following way:
- D1 v ∃r. • C ; D1 v ∃r.C.
Such a transformation preserves satisfiability.
Proposition 1. For every EL•⊥ TBox T , T is satisfiable iff T ′ is.
For a TBox T , let `T be the set of all the concepts appearing as subconcepts in the
axioms in T , and in particular let `EL⊥T ⊆ `T be the set of the EL⊥-concepts appearing
as subconcepts in T . Given a Tbox T , a ranked modelR of T and an object x ∈ ∆R:
g(R, x) = {(R′, y) | ∀C ∈ `EL⊥T , y ∈ CR
′
iff x ∈ CR}
That is, g is a function that defines equivalence classes of pairs (R, x) w.r.t. the
satisfaction of the EL⊥-concepts appearing in T . Each g(R, x) can be also seen as an
object with an associated label, that is, the set of concepts in `EL
⊥
T that it satisfies. We
will abuse notation by writing C ∈ g(R, x) to indicate that C ∈ `EL⊥T and x ∈ CR. We
will also use the letters u, v, . . . to indicate the sets g(R, x). Let ∆T be the set of all the
g(R, x) defined from a TBox T (modulo equivalence). ∆T will be a finite set, since
`EL
⊥
T is. We will use the domain ∆
T to define a different kind of ranked interpretation
we refer to as a schema, where the objects in ∆T are not connected through roles
between themselves. For example, if ∃r.C ∈ g(R, x), there is no role r connecting
g(R, x) to some g(R′, y) s.t. C ∈ g(R′, y). We will denote the schemas for a TBox T
with the lettersM,N, . . ., where a schemaN = 〈∆N ,≺N 〉 is composed of a set∆N ⊆
∆T and≺N is a modular order over ∆N (the finitess of ∆N guarantees the satisfaction
of the smoothness condition). Formally, schemas can be seen as propositional valuations
where every atomic concept A ∈ `EL⊥T and every concept of the form ∃r.C ∈ `EL
⊥
T
are treated like atomic letters in propositional logic. Still, it is constrained in such a
way to respect the EL⊥ logical constraints: for example, if ∃r.A1 u A2 ∈ u, it must
be the case that ∃r.A1 ∈ u. Given a TBox T ′, the notion of interpretation in a model
N = 〈∆N ,≺N 〉 is defined as:
- for every concept C ∈ `EL⊥T , CN = {g(R, x) ∈ ∆N | C ∈ g(R, x)};
- (•C)N = min≺N (CN );
- N  D1 v D2 iff DN1 ⊆ DN2 .
A schema N is a model of a TBox T iff it satisfies all the axioms in T . We also
introduce the following notation:
- (D1 v D2)N = {g(R, x) ∈ ∆N | if g(R, x) ∈ DN1 , then g(R, x) ∈ DN2 };
- T N = {g(R, x) ∈ ∆N | g(R, x) ∈ (D1 v D2)N for every D1 v D2 ∈ T };
The procedure to create a model for LM∗-minimisation is divided into two sub-
procedures. For any ranked interpretation N = 〈∆N ,≺N 〉 (∆N ⊆ ∆T ) and S ⊆ ∆N ,
we define N ↓ S (the restriction of N to S) as 〈∆N ∩ S,≺N ∩(S × S)〉.
The overall procedure is defined as follows:
– Given a TBox T , transform it into a TBox T ′, as described above. In T ′ there can
be axioms of only two types, C1 v C2 and •C1 v C2, with C1, C2 being classical
EL⊥ concepts. Note that `EL⊥T ′ = `EL
⊥
T , and consequently ∆
T ′ = ∆T .
– Procedure 1:
We will build a sequence of interpretations N0, N1, . . ., with Ni = 〈S0,≺i〉. The
first time we execute this procedure we start with S0 := ∆T .
Step 1 Initialise ≺0:= ∅ (start with an initial ranked interpretation in which all
objects are equally preferred).
Step 2 Si+1 := T ′Ni (separate the objects which satisfy T ′ w.r.t. the current
ranked interpretation Ni from those that do not).
Step 3 If Si+1 = Si then return N∗(T ′) := Ni ↓ Si+1 (if the division is the same
as in the previous round then eliminate completely from the current ranked
interpretation those objects that do not satisfy T ′ w.r.t. Ni and return the inter-
pretation that remains) and go to Procedure 2.
Step 4 Otherwise ≺i+1:=≺i ∪(Si+1 × Sci+1), i := i + 1 and go to Step 2 (oth-
erwise create a new ranked interpretation Ni+1 by making every object not
in Si+1 less plausible than every object in Si+1. Note that Sc here denotes
∆T \ S).
So, we end up with a schema N∗(T ′) = 〈∆∗,≺∗〉.
– Procedure 2:
Step 1 Set A{•CvD} := {C | •C v D ∈ T ′} and check hN∗(T ′)(C) for every
C ∈ A•CvD.
Step 2 Impose a linear order of all the elements of ∆∗: t0 = 〈v1, . . . , vn〉.
Step 3 i := 0.
Step 4 j := 0.
Step 5 ti+1 := ti.
Step 6 Let vj = g(R, x). If vj /∈ ti+1, do nothing. Else, for all the concepts of
form ∃r.C ∈ vj , check if there is a w ∈ ti+1 s.t. C ∈ w. If there is one, do
nothing; if there is not, eliminate vj from ti+1 (ti+1 := ti+1 \ {vj}).
Step 7 j := j + 1.
Step 8 If j ≤ n, go back to step 6. If j > n, the if ti+1 = ti, set M∗(T ′) :=
N∗(T ′) ↓ Ti (where Ti is the set of the objects in ti). Else, set i := i + 1 and
go back to Step 4.
Step 9 If hM∗(T ′)(C) = hN∗(T ′)(C) for every C ∈ A•CvD, then return MT ′ :=
M∗(T ′). Else set S0 := Ti and go back to Procedure 1.
The output of Procedure 1 is a schema N∗(T ′) that does not consider the role con-
nections. The output of Procedure 2 is a schema M∗(T ′) that eliminates the objects
that imply the presence of unsatisfiable role connections. For example, the output of
Procedure 1 could contain some object v s.t. ∃r.C ∈ v, but C /∈ u for any u in the do-
main. Such objects must be eliminated, and Procedure 2 takes care of that. Nonetheless,
Procedure 2 could erase the lower layer of some concept C ∈ `EL⊥T , and consequently
there could be some axiom •C v D2 ∈ T ′ that is not satisfied anymore. We go back
to Procedure 1 to take care of that. We go on until we do not find a stable configuration
MT ′ . Since ∆T is a finite set, the overall procedure must terminate.
From MT ′ we can obtain a model MT by modifying the labels of the objects: for
every axiom D1 v ∃r. • C ∈ T , for every object in MT ′ satisfying D1 add to its label
also the concept ∃r. • C (note that ∃r.C was already in its label), and (∃r. • C)MT =
{g(R, x) ∈ ∆MT | ∃r. • C ∈ g(R, x)}.
Proposition 2. The schema MT is a model of T .
Now that we have MT , we can use it to build DL ranked models.
Definition 8. [DL-completion] Given a TBox T and the model MT , partitioned into
the layers {LM0 , . . . , LMn }, a ranked DL modelR = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉 is a DL-completion
of MT iff
– R is partitioned into a sequence of layers {LR0 , . . . , LRm} (m ≥ n).
– If x ∈ LRi , then (R, x) ∈ g(R′, y) for some g(R′, y) ∈ LMj , j ≤ i.
– For every g(R′, y) ∈ LMi , there is at least one x ∈ LRi s.t. (R, x) ∈ g(R′, y).
If ∆R is finite,R is a finite DL-completion of MT .
LetRMT be the set of all the DL interpretations that DL-completeMT , andR
fin
MT ⊆
RMT the set of the finite ones. We can prove that DL-completion are always definable
from a schema MT and are models of T .
Proposition 3. Given a schema MT ,RfinMT is non-empty.
Proposition 4. IfR is a DL-completion of MT , thenR is a model of T .
Now we define a modelRT = 〈∆RT , ·RT ,≺RT 〉 that in practice unifies in a single
ranked model all the finite models inRfinMT .RT is defined in the following way:
– ∆R
T
= {xR | x ∈ ∆R andR ∈ RfinMT } (we unify all the domains of the models
inRfinMT in an unique domain).
– For every atomic concept A xR ∈ ART iff x ∈ AR.
– For every role r, (xR, y′R) ∈ rR
T
iffR = R′ and (x, y) ∈ rR.
– hRT (xR) = hR(x).
RT is still a DL-completion of MT , and it is the model we are looking for. That is,
it characterises LM∗-entailment.
Proposition 5 (Uniqueness of the LM∗-minimal schema). Given an EL•⊥TBox T , all
its LM∗-minimal models are DL-completions of the schema MT .
Theorem 2. Given a TBox T ,RT characterises the LM∗-entailment. That is,
T |=LM∗ C v D iffRT  C v D
Example 4. Let T be the TBox of Example 3. The TBox T ′ is obtained substituting
C v ∃r. • D with C v ∃r.D, and `EL⊥T ′ = {B,F, P,E,A,C,∃r.D,D}. In order to
build MT ′ , first we fill ∆T with one object for each subset of `EL⊥T ′ (since |`EL⊥T ′ | = 8,
|∆T | = 28). Through Procedure 1 we end up with a schema N∗T ′ in which (i) all the
elements of ∆T satisfying P and not B, P and not E, E u F , C and not ∃r.D are
eliminated, and (ii) among the remaining elements of ∆T , all the ones satisfying B and
not F (hence also all the ones satisfying P ) and the ones not satisfying A go to the
upper Layer 1. Moving to Procedure 2, in the domain there are objects satisfying ∃r.D,
hence the procedure checks that there are objects in the domain satisfying D, and the
procedure terminates with MT ′ := N∗T ′ . The schema MT is obtained just adding the
concept ∃r. •D to all the objects satisfying C, and MT is the schema we use to define
LM∗-minimality.
The fact that LM∗-minimality can be characterised through a single model guaran-
tees that some desirable logical properties are preserved, since the set of axioms satisfied
by a single ranked model defines a rational subsumption [2].
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we started an investigation of what it means to reason about typicality in
DLs once we go beyond the expressivity of defeasible subsumption. In the framework of
DLs, the enforcement of the principle of presumption of typicality through minimisation
procedures turns out to be even more complex than in the case of PTL, since even the
notion of LM-entailment, that in the case of PTL can be decided with easy procedures
and gives back reliable results, becomes difficult to manage in the DL framework. We
considered an extension of the language EL⊥ that is strongly constrained, but still very
interesting from the point of view of knowledge representation. We defined a notion of
minimal entailment that can be characterised through a single model. In this way we
guarantee that the subsumption relation behaves rationally. The result also opens the
possibility of the definition of an effective decision procedure.
To the best of our knowledge the only proposals for extending the expressivity of
reasoning about typicality in DLs beyond the expressivity of defeasible subsumption
axioms are the ones by Bonatti et al. [15], that is developed in a different semantics,
and by Giordano et al. [7, 8], that is defined for ABox reasoning. Hence our work is the
first in which the investigation focuses on TBox reasoning in a language that extends
that of defeasible subsumption in a preferential framework.
The next step is the definition of an effective procedure to decide the LM∗-entailment
of a EL•⊥TBox T : the most promising options are either the use of the schema MT or,
using as a starting point a tractable procedure to decide RC for EL⊥ enriched with
defeasible subsumption [27], defining a decision procedure for EL•⊥ TBoxes that is
correct w.r.t. the model RT . This will be followed by an analysis of ABox reasoning
and the investigation of other languages, either extending EL•⊥or related to the DL-lite
family [28].
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Appendix - Proofs
Theorem 1 (Finite Model Property - FMP). Let T be a finite EL•⊥TBox. If T has a
ranked modelR, then T has a finite ranked modelR′.
Proof. Given a model R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉 of T , we can build a finite model R′ =
〈∆R′ , ·R′ ,≺R′〉 in the following way:
– ∆R
′
= {g(〈R, x〉) | x ∈ ∆R} (g is the same function used in Section 5 of the
paper);
– for every atomic concept A ∈ `EL⊥T , AR
′
= {g(〈R, x〉) ∈ ∆R′ | x ∈ AR};
– every atomic concept A /∈ `EL⊥T can be interpreted freely;
– for every role r, rR
′
= {〈g(〈R, x〉), g(〈R, y〉)〉 | 〈x, y〉 ∈ rR};
– g(〈R, x〉) ≺R′ g(〈R, y〉) iff there is an object x′ ∈ g(〈R, x〉) ∩∆R s.t. for all the
objects y′ ∈ g(〈R, y〉) ∩∆R, x′ ≺R y′.
It can be easily checked by induction on the construction of the concepts that for
every concept C in `EL⊥T , x ∈ CR iff g(〈R, x〉) ∈ CR
′
.
We need to prove that ≺R′ is a modular relation (smoothness comes out for free,
since it is a finite model). Let rk be a ranking function that associate every g(〈R, x〉) ∈
∆R
′
to the number hR(z), where 〈R, z〉 ∈ g(〈R, x〉) and hR(z) ≤ hR(y) for ev-
ery 〈R, y〉 ∈ g(〈R, x〉). It is immediate to see from the definition of ≺R′ that for
every g(〈R, x〉), g(〈R, y〉) ∈ ∆R′ , g(〈R, x〉) ≺R′ g(〈R, y〉) iff rk(g(〈R, x〉)) <
rk(g(〈R, y〉)).
Finally, we have to prove thatR′ is a model of T .
In order to obtain that, we first prove the following: for every C ∈ `EL⊥T and for
every g(〈R, x〉) ∈ ∆R′ , if in g(〈R, x〉) there is a z s.t. z ∈ •CR, then g(〈R, x〉) ∈
•CR′ .
If z ∈ •CR, then hR(z) = hR(C). Assume that g(〈R, x〉) /∈ •CR′ ; since g(〈R, x〉) ∈
CR
′
, it means that there is a g(〈R, y〉) ∈ ∆R′ s.t. g(〈R, y〉) ∈ •CR′ , that implies
that g(〈R, y〉) ≺R′ g(〈R, x〉). However, that cannot be the case, since we would have
that in g(〈R, y〉) there is an object z′ ∈ ∆R s.t. z′ ∈ CR and z′ ≺R z′′ for every
z′′ ∈ g(〈R, x〉), against the assumption that z ∈ g(〈R, x〉) and z ∈ (•C)R.
So, now we know that:
– for every concept C in `EL⊥T , x ∈ CR iff g(〈R, x〉) ∈ CR
′
;
– for every concept •C in `T , g(〈R, x〉) ∈ CR′ iff there is a z ∈ g(〈R, x〉) s.t.
z ∈ •CR;
– for every role r, rR
′
= {〈g(〈R, x〉), g(〈R, y〉)〉 | 〈x, y〉 ∈ rR};
From these three points it is easy to derive that the satisfaction of the axioms in T
is preserved fromR toR′. It is sufficient to check all the four kinds of axioms allowed
in our language:
1. C1 v C2
2. •C1 v C2
3. C1 v ∃r. • C2
4. •C1 v ∃r. • C2
2
Corollary 1 (Finite Countermodel Property - FCMP). Let T be a finite EL•⊥TBox
and C v D an EL•⊥axiom. If T has a ranked modelR s.t.R is not a model of C v D,
then T has also a finite ranked modelR′ s.t. it is a counter-model of C v D.
Proof. It is sufficient to go through the proof of Theorem 1, just considering also the
concepts C and D (and their sub-concepts) in the definition of the function g.
2
It is also easy to check from Definition 8 in the paper that if a model R is a DL-
completion of a schema, the finite model defined using the procedures in the above
proofs are finite DL-completion of the same schema.
Proposition 1. For every EL•⊥ TBox T , T is satisfiable iff T ′ is.
Proof. If R is a model of T , it is immediately also a model of T ′. For the other direc-
tion, letR′ = 〈∆R′ , ·R′ ,≺R′〉 be a model of T ′ and letD ⊆ T be the set of the axioms
in T with the form D1 v ∃r. • C that have been transformed into axioms D1 v ∃r.C
in T ′.
Define a modelR = 〈∆R′ , ·R,≺R′〉 as:
– for every atomic concept A, AR = AR
′
;
– for every role r and every pair x, y ∈ ∆R′ , if (x, y) ∈ rR′ then (x, y) ∈ rR;
– for every axiom D1 v ∃r. • C ∈ D and every x ∈ DR′1 , add to rR (if not present
already) a pair (x, y) s.t. y ∈ (•C)R′ .
It is easy to prove by induction on the construction of the concepts that for every
EL⊥-concept C, CR = CR′ . Also, since every x ∈ ∆R′ preserves the same height in
R (≺R′ is unchanged), for every concept •C, (•C)R = (•C)R′ .
About the last condition in the definition ofR, note that (•C)R′ must be non-empty:
R′ is a model of T ′, for every D1 v ∃r. • C ∈ T , D1 v ∃r.C is in T ′ and x ∈ DR′1 ,
hence there must be an object z ∈ CR′ s.t. (x, z) ∈ rR′ ; by smoothness, CR′ 6= ∅
imposes (•C)R′ 6= ∅.
We can have four kinds of axioms in T :
1. C1 v C2
2. •C1 v C2
3. C1 v ∃r. • C2
4. •C1 v ∃r. • C2
For each axiom of kind 1 or 2 we immediately obtain that R satisfies it. The last
condition in the definition ofR guarantees also the satisfaction of the axioms of kind 3
and 4 (the ones in D).
2
Proposition 2. The schema MT is a model of T .
Proof. We need to prove that the outcome of out overall procedure, MT ′ , is a model of
T ′. It is sufficient to prove that every iteration of Procedure 1 gives back a schema that
satisfies T ′, and the last iteration of Procedure 2 preserves the satisfaction of T ′.
Every iteration of Procedure 1 gives necessarily back a schema that satisfies T ′,
since the construction is such that T ′N∗(T ′) = ∆N∗(T ′).
Then, assume that after the last application of Procedure 2 we have an object u ∈
∆MT ′ s.t. u /∈ T ′MT ′ . In T ′ we have only axioms of the kinds C1 v C2 or •C1 v C2,
hence such a situation could arise only for axioms of the form •C1 v C2, that is, there
is an object that is in (•C1)MT ′ but not in CMT ′2 . At the end of the last iteration of
Procedure 1 u ∈ T ′N∗(T ′) (otherwise it would have been eliminated), then we would
have u /∈ T ′MT ′ only if after the last iteration of Procedure 1 u /∈ (•C1)N∗(T ′) but after
the last iteration of Procedure 2 u ∈ (•C1)MT ′ ; such a situation cannot occur because
of the condition on the last application of Procedure 2 (hM∗(T ′)(C) = hN∗(T ′)(C) for
every C ∈ A•CvD).
MT ′ being a model of T ′ implies that MT is a model of T .
2
Proposition 3. Given a schema MT ,RfinMT is non-empty.
Proof. We give an example of how to build a DL ranked interpretation R from MT .
Populate∆R with one object for each object in∆MT :∆R = {xg(R′,y) | g(R′, y) ∈
∆MT }.
1. for every xg(R
′,y) ∈ ∆R, hR(xg(R′,y)) = hMT (g(R′, y)));
2. for every atomic concept A, AR = {xg(R′,y) | y ∈ AR′};
3. for every concept ∃r.C s.t. y ∈ ∃r.CR′ , add a role connection from xg(R′,y) to
some object in zg(R
∗,u) in ∆R s.t. u ∈ CR∗ ;
4. for every concept ∃r. • D s.t. it has been added to the label of g(R′, y), add a
role connection from xg(R
′,y) to some object in zg(R
∗,u) in ∆R s.t. u ∈ CR∗ and
zg(R
∗,u) is minimal in R w.r.t. objects associated to C.
The procedure creating MT ′ from N∗(T ′) guarantees that we can satisfy point 3;
the definition of MT from MT ′ guarantees that we can satisfy also point 4 (see the
proof of Proposition 1).
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Proposition 4. IfR is a DL-completion of MT , thenR is a model of T .
Proof. We can have in T axioms of four possible forms: C1 v C2, •C1 v C2, C1 v
∃r.•C2, •C1 v ∃r.•C2 (C1, C2 being EL⊥ axioms). The definition of DL-completion
guarantees that the satisfaction of an axiom is preserved for each kind of axiom.
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Proposition 5. Given an EL•⊥TBox T , all its LM∗-minimal models are DL-completions
of the schema MT .
Proof. Assume there is an LM∗-minimal model R of T that is not a DL-completion
of MT . Then it is a DL-completion of another schema M ′. We can define M ′ building
a DL model as in the proof of the Finite Model Property, Theorem 1, then changing it
into a schema just eliminating all the role connections, but preserving the interpretation
of all the concepts in `EL⊥T .
This means that there is an i s.t. LMTj = L
M ′
j for every j < i (if i > 0), and there
is a g(〈R, x〉) ∈ LM ′i that is not in
⋃
k≤i L
MT
k . We need to prove that cannot be the
case. g(〈R, x〉) must have been eliminated from ⋃k≤i LMTk either in one iteration of
Procedure 1 or in one iteration of Procedure 2.
Assume it happened in the first application of Procedure 1. Assume that i = 0,
that is, g(〈R, x〉) ∈ LM ′0 but g(〈R, x〉) /∈ LMT0 . That cannot be the case, since the
elimination of g(〈R, x〉) from Layer 0 by Procedure 1 implies that there is no schema
satisfying T with g(〈R, x〉) in the lower layer. Assume that i > 0, and, by induction
hypothesis, that there is no schema satisfying T ′ with g(〈R, x〉) in a layer j, j < i, all
the lower layers being equal to the correspondent ones in N∗(T ′); the same argument
applies, that is, Procedure 1 implies that there is no schema satisfying T ′ with g(〈R, x〉)
in the layer i. This also implies that there is no LM∗-minimal schema of T in which
there are objects eliminated in the first application of Procedure 1.
Now, assume g(〈R, x〉) has been eliminated from⋃k≤i LMTk in the first application
of Procedure 2. Since the objects eliminated from ∆T in Procedure 1 cannot be in any
LM∗-minimal schema of T , also the objects eliminated by Procedure 2 cannot be in
any schema that can be DL-completed into a DL-model, since they are all objects that
should be role-connected to objects that cannot be in the schema.
Let g(〈R, x〉) be eliminated from⋃k≤i LMTk either in the kth application of Proce-
dure 1 or Procedure 2. By induction hypothesis g(〈R, x〉) has not yet been eliminated
from
⋃
k≤i L
MT
k , and all the objects eliminated from ∆
T in the previous applications
of Procedures 1 and 2 are correct.
Assume g(〈R, x〉) has been eliminated from ⋃k≤i LMTk in the kth application of
Procedure 1. If i = 0, then there cannot be a schema of T ′ that has g(〈R, x〉) in the
layer 0. If i > 0, analogously to the first case, by induction hypothesis there is no
schema satisfying T ′ with g(〈R, x〉) in a layer j, j < i; the same argument applies,
that is, Procedure 1 implies that there is no schema satisfying T ′ with g(〈R, x〉) in the
layer i, all the lower layers being equal to the ones in N∗(T ′).
Again, Procedure 2 in every iteration destroys only objects that in the DL-completion
would be role-connected to objects that cannot be in any LM∗-minimal model, since
they are eliminated by Procedure 1.
Hence, it is not possible to have an LM∗-minimal schema that differs from MT .
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Theorem 2. Given a TBox T ,RT characterises the LM∗-entailment. That is,
T |=LM∗ C v D iffRT  C v D
Proof. Let R be a LM∗-minimal model of T . Then it is a DL-completion of MT . If
R 6 D1 v D2, then by the FCMP (Corollary 1) there is a finite model Rfin of T that
does not satisfy D1 v D2, that is in RfinMT . Hence Rfin takes part in the definition of
RT . It is easy to check that, in such a case, whatever form D1 v D2 has, RT would
not satisfy it.
